Introduction
Although the origins of intergenerational justice as a major debate in ethical theory are multifaceted, a critical factor has been our increasing awareness and understanding of major environmental threats. Issues such as depletion of the ozone layer, the environmental impact of genetically modified organisms and, in particular, global climate change have raised the profile of previously marginal questions such as: do we have duties of justice to protect the environment for future generations? If so, what sorts of duties and how strong are they? Can these duties ever conflict and override the duties of justice we have to our contemporaries? Do future generations possess claims of justice against earlier generations that specify how income and wealth should be distributed across time?
Any comprehensive approach to questions such as the above must address three interlinked, but distinct, ethical problems. The first problem is how to establish the 'scope of justice'. This is the question of which entities possess distributive entitlements, as well as the question of which entities are bound by duties to guarantee these entitlements (O'Neill 2000, pp. 186ff.) . The second problem concerns the appropriate 'currency of justice' (such as resources, welfare, or basic needs) that a theory of distribution adopts in order to concretize the level of entitlement possessed by those identified as subjects. The third problem, which is the focus of this article, concerns the 'pattern of justice' . The issue here is the selection of an appropriate distributive aim (such as equality, priority, or sufficiency) that specifies how much of a given currency of well-being the subjects of justice are entitled to receive (Hurley 2003, pp. 147ff.) .
1 Roughly stated, then, the three problems concern who (scope) should get how much (pattern) of what conception of well-being (currency).
In this article, I aim to contribute to the development of intergenerational justice by exploring alternative accounts of the pattern of intergenerational benefits and burdens. With the aid of examples drawn from research into global climate change I argue, first, that environmental threats (as well as policies designed to respond to them) are of great significance to discussions of the achievement of all of the familiar approaches to the pattern of justice. Second, I suggest how each of these approaches might be applied to issues of intergenerational distribution. Third, I explore the particular merits of the 'sufficientarian' approach to intergenerational justice, according to which benefits and burdens should be distributed so that as many persons as possible enjoy decent lives regardless of when they live.
In order to focus as much as possible on alternative theories of the pattern (rather than the scope) of justice, the discussion proceeds from the universalist assumption that future persons, at least in principle, possess valid claims on social goods. I also assume that it is meaningful to investigate the intergenerational application of theories of the pattern of justice in relative isolation of the question of the currency of justice. In this way, I refer throughout to a general notion of 'well-being' when it is necessary to refer to the unit in terms of which distributive entitlements should be determined. Finally, I focus below on 'undeserved' disadvantages, such as inequalities or absolute disadvantages that are beyond the control of those they affect, and put to one side the problem of 'deserved' disadvantages, such as those that result from an agent's autonomous choices.
Distributive Justice as Equality
Perhaps the simplest theory of the pattern of justice is that benefits and burdens should be distributed across some population so that inequality is minimized. We might call this view 'intrinsic egalitarianism' as it holds that inequality is bad or unjust (I use these terms interchangeably) in itself and not because of its consequences. As Temkin has put it, the essence of intrinsic equality is that 'it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own' (Temkin 2003, p. 62) .
It is worth contrasting intrinsic equality with some closely associated views. Utilitarians hold that acts and social policies should be evaluated only in terms of their consequences and that these consequences ought to promote the maximum amount of welfare possible. Depending on the circumstances the utilitarian may prefer an equal distribution of well-being because this coincides with the desire to maximize welfare. The reason for this is that it is generally easier to help the worse off than others-one only has to give them a little for their welfare level to improve a lot. In this sense, utilitarians are 'accidental', rather than intrinsic, egalitarians.
There are other 'accidentally egalitarian' theories of distribution that are more persuasive than utilitarianism. Some of these are motivated by the somewhat paradoxical feature of intrinsic egalitarianism that it aims to reduce, or avoid, inequalities even when this does not benefit the worst off. The distinction between reducing inequality and giving priority to the worst off has been explored by Derek Parfit in terms of a further clarification of intrinsic egalitarianism. According to Parfit intrinsic egalitarians can be divided into two camps: those that assume that inequality is always in itself bad ('telic egalitarians') and those that assume that inequality is bad only if it has certain origins ('deontic egalitarians') (Parfit 2000, pp. 84ff.) . There are a number of differences between these two views. One is that they diverge on the issue of how we should assess the badness of an unequal distribution. Thus, the telic view assumes that the greater the inequality, the worse the outcome. On the deontic view, however, more inequality might not always mean a worse outcome. It all depends on how this inequality came about.
Parfit went on to show that endorsing either version of intrinsic egalitarianism has important consequences. One of these concerned the way in which applying egalitarianism could have counter-intuitive implications. Consider a version of what has become known as the 'leveling down problem' (Parfit 2000, p. 98) . Here, half of some population are rich and enjoys a high level of well-being, while the other half is impoverished and experiences a much lower level of well-being. Other things being equal, intrinsic egalitarianism would view a move to an entirely impoverished population in such cases as just in at least one respect since this would minimize inequality, a view that Parfit and others have regarded as absurd (Nagel 1979, pp. 106ff.; Raz 1986, pp. 230 -235) . The leveling down problem suggests that we must either reject the view that it is just in one respect to bring some down to the level of others even if no one benefits, or reject the view that inequality is in itself unjust.
While the leveling down problem seems to apply to all formulations of the telic view, it does not seem to plague the obvious interpretations of the deontic view since these will only condemn outcomes that arise as a result of wrongdoing. The well-off in the above example might, for example, be entirely blameless for the plight of their less well-off compatriots, so the inequality between these groups may not be regrettable from the deontic egalitarian point of view. Nevertheless, in theory, the deontic view will require that we level down for the sake of no one if the original inequality was the product of wrongdoing. This is an important observation, for some egalitarians have argued that much of the global inequality that exists today, and which will persist into the future, has origins in the past wrongdoing of individuals and institutions in rich populations (Pogge 2005, pp. 92ff) . Although highly controversial, this claim, if defensible, would reduce significantly the number of occasions where the deontic view would have alternative implications to the telic view. That is, where it is possible to destroy resources to restore equality, it would be just in one respect for the deontic egalitarian to level down for the benefit of no one. The leveling down problem can be reformulated to cover dealings between different generations. Suppose that, following the work of economic growth enthusiasts such as Wilfrid Beckerman and Bjørn Lomborg, almost all persons living in future generations will be better off than their predecessors, despite the environmental and social problems the former are set to inherit (Beckerman & Pasek 2001, pp. 50ff.; Lomborg 2001, pp. 327-352) . According to the telic view, it would be better in one respect if the present generation consumed a certain amount of resources so that our descendants will not be any better off than us. That is, present persons would be under some moral pressure to develop unsustainably since sustainable development, on all of its formulations, involves development and hence the creation of intergenerational inequality. According to the deontic view, this pressure is removed since it does not seem plausible to argue that the intergenerational inequality brought about by the sacrifices of earlier generations to save for the benefit of their successors involves wrongdoing.
Because it turns on our intuitions about the relationship between equality and other values, and the examples discussed here are rather abstract, it is not obvious how intrinsic egalitarians should respond to the leveling down problem. Some, such as Larry Temkin, have argued that the problem is illusory. Temkin holds that the leveling down problem merely shows us a consequence of egalitarianism, not a reason to reject it. Given that we believe in a number of ideals, Temkin's thought is that leveled down outcomes are always desirable 'in one respect' even though they may be undesirable 'all things considered' (Temkin 2003, pp. 68ff .). Temkin's uncompromising defence of telic egalitarianism raises a number of interesting questions about the nature of distributive justice, as well as the appropriate methodology adopted to analyse it. To some, Temkin is merely attempting to defend the indefensible (Crisp 2003, pp. 758ff.) . The problem is that there is no obvious methodological procedure to separate an 'indefensible' view from a view that is cogent but has yet to develop strong intuitive support.
Recall that a different response to rescue intrinsic egalitarianism from the leveling down problem is to appeal to deontic egalitarianism. The problem with this appeal, which adds force to Parfit's critique of intrinsic egalitarianism as a whole, is that it cannot explain what is unjust about inequalities between individuals or groups that do not engage, or have not in the past engaged, in reciprocal dealings. Suppose two populations A and B exist, but have little or no mutual dealings. One day a member of the A population decides to visit population B out of curiosity and finds to their surprise that the people in B are very badly off compared with those in A, although well-being in both populations is evenly distributed. On the telic view, the inequality evident between A and B is regrettable (and all things being equal, should be removed as a matter of justice) even if it was not brought about by wrongdoing. It makes no difference that the inequality arose between populations that have hitherto had no mutual dealings. The deontic egalitarian, on the other hand, will regard such inequalities as trivial from the point of view of justice since the inequality did not arise from wrongdoing. Let us call this the 'blameless inequality' problem.
Granted that the deontic egalitarian might recognize other non justice-based reasons to remove the inequality between A and B, such as compassion or charity, this approach does not seem to be a plausible rendering of either egalitarianism or distributive justice in more general terms. The dubious global implications of deontic egalitarianism can be shown by reflecting on the following simple thought experiment.
2 Suppose it transpires, as the first wave of climate sceptics maintained, that global climate change is a very real phenomenon but has entirely natural rather than anthropogenic origins (Singer 2000, pp. 1-78) . Such a revelation would not affect the fundamental message of a host of climate impact analyses which indicate that climate change will be generally, if not uniformly, adverse for millions of existing and future persons (McMichael & Githeko 2001, pp. 451-485; Schellnhuber et al. 2006, pp. 133-202) . Deontic egalitarians, however, will regard efforts to mitigate inequalities caused, or exacerbated, by climate change as beyond the call of justice since they could not be traced to wrongdoing. The telic view, by contrast, requires that inequalities caused by climate change be rectified even if no human culprit can be found.
To conclude this section, it seems that both telic egalitarianism (in condoning leveling down for the benefit of no one) and deontic egalitarianism (in leaving the unlucky victims of blameless inequality to fend for themselves) are flawed understandings of the pattern of justice.
Distributive Justice as Priority
One way in which those broadly sympathetic to egalitarianism might avoid the leveling down and blameless inequality problems would be to embrace the ideal of priority, according to which the worse off people are, the more it matters from the point of view of justice that they be benefited. Parfit calls this the 'Priority View', and those holding it 'prioritarians' (Parfit 2000, p. 101) . Prioritarians reject the basis of both telic and deontic egalitarianism, namely, that it is bad that some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. This is because they are unconcerned with the comparative properties of distributive outcomes. Instead, they think it regrettable that people are badly off as such:
Benefits to the worst off matter more, but that is only because these people are at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than others. Benefits to them would matter just as much even if there were no others who were better off. (Parfit 2000, p. 104; original emphasis) Similarly, Arneson defines prioritarianism as the view that: 'It is morally more urgent (gains more moral value) to obtain a one-unit well-being gain for a person, the lower the person's lifetime well-being otherwise would be' (Arneson 2006, p. 27) .
Consider the following example which concerns choices between competing social policies that alter the distribution of well-being within a hypothetical population. For simplicity I assume that the policy choices discussed, although they may alter the amount and distribution of well-being, will not alter the population size. The alternative distributions of well-being reflect the possible outcomes of two broad policy 'programmes' that policy-makers can select, each being associated with three specific 'policy options'. In the case of Distribution 1, the requirements of equality and priority converge. Other things being equal, they guide us to choose policy option (1), either because all are equal with respect to well-being; or that the worst off are better off under (1) than they are under (2) and (3). However, in the case of Distribution 2, the equality and priority views do not converge since inequality exists in outcomes (1) and (2) that does not exist in (3), and the worst off are better off in outcome (1) than they are in (2) or (3). Utilitarianism, by contrast, will favour (2) in both cases since this is the outcome where well-being is maximized. Although the Distribution 1/ Distribution 2 example is constructed at an abstract level, it tells us that, while they often converge in their distributive recommendations, egalitarianism, prioritarianism and utilitarianism are rival approaches to the pattern of justice.
The distinction between equality and priority is of clear relevance to the construction of theories of intergenerational justice. First, environmental threats such as global climate change pose different sorts of challenge to egalitarianism and prioritarianism when they are applied across time. Second, equality and priority will diverge in what they require of us in relation to our successors.
Regarding the first issue, environmental threats such as climate change are highly relevant for any practical application of the priority view since they will without doubt influence the absolute well-being of all in the future. There is a wide consensus amongst natural and social scientists that climate changes, such as sea-level rises and extreme weather events, will have a major role in determining which regions, and populations, will be worst off in the future and to what extent. One specific example is that increased frequency and severity of coastal flooding will degrade the food and water security of millions in coastal zones and small islands (Nurse & Sem 2001, pp. 854ff.; Schellnhuber et al. 2006, pp. 167-185 ). This will exacerbate any existing inequalities between coastal and non-coastal populations, but it will also mean that many more persons will be forced to live in absolute poverty.
Climate change can also be expected to help determine which generations will be most disadvantaged in the future. One problem concerns 'low probability, high impact' events. These are global climate events caused by the emergence of climate processes that have occurred many times since the evolution of humankind. One example concerns the cessation, or repositioning, of the thermohaline circulation process that transports heat throughout the globe through movements of surface and deep-sea water. Such an event would have massive social, economic and health impacts on populations residing in Europe and North America, potentially triggering global crisis (Schellnhuber et al. 2006, pp. 37-63) . While there are huge problems in quantifying the probability of such events occurring, the threat they pose to human well-being in terms of uncertainty and risk alone warrant them being factored into debates concerning distributive justice.
Turning to the second issue, suppose that the populations experiencing different levels of well-being in the Distribution 2 sample belonged to a different time-period where the lives of their members do not overlap. Suppose, next, that the differential prospects of these populations arise as a consequence of the different environmental policy choices adopted by a previous generation (the population halves representing the earlier and the later generation respectively). We might say that policy (1) equates to a moderate conservation stance; policy (2) to no conservation at all; and policy (3) to a radical conservationist stance, which could sustain the same wellbeing levels indefinitely but at a lower level than either of the other less sustainable policies (see Table 1 ).
In this simple, two-generation model, intergenerational egalitarians would have at least some reason to prefer (3). That is, they would have an egalitarian objection to the other two divisions that does not arise with this distribution. Utilitarians, on the other hand, would favour (2) since it maximizes total well-being across both generations. Finally, prioritarians would favour (1) as the worst off population is better off under this policy than the alternatives. The picture would change as we include further populations from different time-periods, but this example supports the conclusion that the pattern of justice we prefer will influence our approach to both intergenerational and intergenerational distribution.
Distributive Justice as Sufficiency
To sum up the discussion so far, prioritarianism is a demanding approach to distributive justice that tolerates inequality if it is of benefit to the worst off. It is not subject to the 'leveling down' or 'blameless inequality' problems since it is a non-comparative view that ignores the origins of the pattern of any given distribution. Finally, it recommends alternative distributions of well-being across generations to its egalitarian rival in at least some circumstances.
In contrast to egalitarians and prioritarians, some theorists, such as Harry Frankfurt, hold that benefits and burdens should be distributed in line with the 'doctrine of sufficiency'. This states that as many people as possible should have enough (of the currency of justice adopted) to pursue the aims and aspirations they care about over a whole life; and that this aim has lexical priority over other ideals of justice (Frankfurt 1987, pp. 21-43; 1997, pp. 3 -14) . Attaining what we really care about, for Frankfurt, requires a certain level of well-being, but once this level is reached there is no further relationship between how well-off a person is and whether they discover and fulfil what it is that they really care about. Frankfurt holds that, above the level of sufficiency, it is neither reasonable to seek a higher standard of living nor expect, as a matter of justice, any additional allocation of some currency of justice to further improve their prospects. It is important to add that 'having enough' is not the same as living a 'tolerable' life in the sense that one does not regret one's existence. Rather it means a person leads a life that contains no substantial dissatisfaction.
According to Frankfurt, the flaw in intrinsic egalitarianism 'lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has' (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34) . What matters, Frankfurt argues, 'is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others' (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21 ; original emphasis). This does not mean, however, that egalitarian and prioritarian concerns will always frustrate sufficiency since each and every person should be helped to the threshold of sufficiency if possible, and those who can be helped to lead a decent life are often among the worst off in a population. But the aim of reducing inequality, or of improving the position of the worst off, has no intrinsic value for sufficientarians. Recall the case of Distribution 1:
(1) all at 50 (2) half at 40, half at 70 (3) half at 20, half at 80
Suppose that advances in the human and natural sciences furnished us with an account of the level of well-being at which point a person has 'enough' and that this turned out to be 50 units of some agreed currency of well-being. Equality, priority, and sufficiency would in such circumstances converge on recommending the same distribution: (1). In such circumstances, Frankfurt observes, 'even if equality is not as such morally important, a commitment to an egalitarian social policy may be indispensable to promoting the enjoyment of significant goods besides equality or to avoiding their impairment' (Frankfurt 1987, p. 22 ). The differences between equality, priority and sufficiency becomes clear when we reconsider Distribution 2. Recall that the outcomes here were the following:
(1) half at 49, half at 46 (2) half at 55, half at 45 (3) all at 40 Suppose, again, that the sufficiency level for all was 50. Whereas intrinsic egalitarianism seems, other things being equal, to favour outcome (3) and prioritarianism would favour allocation (1), sufficientarianism would favour outcome (2) since this would be the only outcome in which at least some people had enough. For the sufficientarian, the distribution of benefits and burdens to achieve equality or priority in such circumstances is indefensible. It would be analogous to the tragedy involved in a famine situation of giving food to those who cannot possibly survive at the cost of those that could survive if they received extra rations. In this sense, the ideal of sufficiency is related to the medical concept of 'triage' according to which, when faced with more people requiring care than can be treated, resources are rationed so that the most needy receive attention first. However, because the category of 'most needy' is defined in terms of the overarching aim that as many people as possible should survive a given emergency, triage protocols often lead to the very worst off being denied treatment for the sake of benefitting those who can be helped to survive.
Frankfurt's view is that all distributive claims arise in some way from an analysis of where people stand relative to the threshold of sufficiency, or as he puts it the 'threshold that separates lives that are good from lives that are not good' (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6) . Egalitarianism, by contrast, posits a relationship between the urgency of a person's claims and their comparative well-being without reference to the level at which they would have enough. Since allocating people enough to lead decent lives exhausts our duties of distribution, sufficientarians argue that egalitarianism recognizes duties that do not exist. In fact, in linking ethical duties to the comparative fortunes of people, egalitarianism encourages envy and thereby contributes 'to the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time' (Frankfurt 1987, pp. 22-23; Anderson 1999, pp. 287ff.) .
Although Frankfurt focuses his critique of rival distributive views on intrinsic egalitarianism, it can be readily extended to cover prioritarianism. While the priority view is grounded in the badness of absolute rather than comparative disadvantage, it is also inclined to divert resources to the worst off even if this would mean sacrificing substantial benefits to other, slightly better off, persons who could be helped to lead a decent life. Frankfurt argues that:
It is true that people in the lowest strata of society generally live in horrible conditions, but this association of low social position and dreadful quality of life is entirely contingent. There is no necessary connection between being at the bottom of society and being poor in the sense in which poverty is a serious and morally objectionable barrier to life. (Frankfurt 1997, p. 2) The problem with prioritarianism, then, is not that it fetishizes comparative wellbeing but rather that it fetishizes absolute well-being with the result that it mandates constant interference in people's lives to benefit the worst off. By doing so, prioritarianism is inclined to generate just as much envy and pity as its egalitarian rival and to mandate a range of redistributions that do not help their recipients to lead decent lives.
Consider the following example. There are two groups in society, where one enjoys a considerably lower level of well-being than the other, where both groups enjoy a far better than decent life, and where the inequalities are undeserved. We can call these groups the 'very happy' and the 'extremely happy'. Egalitarians claim that, if we could do something about it, the very happy group should be compensated for their relative well-being deficit. This is because this theory regards undeserved inequality as bad even if everyone is at least very happy; that is, it makes no ethical difference that the inequality is between groups, or persons, who are very well off. Prioritarians, by contrast, regard the very happy in isolation of their relative happiness as they are only interested in absolute levels of well-being. Nonetheless, the very happy, as the worst off, deserve our attention even if their lives are so good they want for nothing. According to sufficientarians, however, the egalitarian and prioritarian claims are absurd. How can there be a duty to help the worst off, they ask, when they already lead lives of such a high standard?
Climate Change, Posterity and the Doctrine of Sufficiency
We have seen that ideals of equality, priority and sufficiency often converge in the pattern of benefits they recommend. However, conflict between these ideals will emerge since the worst off group, comparative fortunes and people's positions relative to the sufficiency threshold differ in various hypothetical examples as well as in real life. So, even if all three ideals are global in the sense that they are applicable to all persons living in all times and places, it can be of great relevance which of these ideals we adopt. In this section, I explore in more detail the benefits of adopting a sufficientarian approach to intergenerational justice.
Consider the impact of climate change on future human health. All human beings require a certain level of health and nutrition to pursue whatever it is they really care about. This is reflected in the broad consensus amongst philosophers that physical and mental health is essential to the functioning of all persons, regardless of their personal, historical, or social context (Doyal & Gough 1991, pp. 49ff.; Copp 1998, pp. 123ff.; Nussbaum 2006, pp. 76-77) . A key finding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has been that the cumulative impacts of climate change on future human health will be extensive and generally adverse (McMichael & Githeko 2001, pp. 451ff.) . The World Health Organization similarly reports that climate change will result in many thousands, possibly millions, of people dying who otherwise would not have died, for example through exposure to extreme heat events, droughts, floods, and changes in infectious disease transmission (McMichael et al. 2003, pp. 43-60) . It seems clear that the health impacts of climate change will prevent many future people from leading lives of a decent quality, regardless of how this is defined.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the sufficiency view has attracted considerable support in the climate change literature in terms of the pre-eminent understanding of sustainable development. Development, on this view, should meet 'the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, p. 43) . Although the source of great debate and controversy, the core idea is that each generation should refrain from activities that leave later generations without enough, but that this does not entail that an injustice is committed if the latter are prevented from enjoying an identical level of well-being. As such, this form of sustainability will generate a different set of requirements to rival constructions grounded in equality, such as that 'each generation is entitled to inherit a planet and cultural resource base at least as good as that of previous generations' (Arrow et al. 1996, pp. 140-141) or that 'welfare per head of the population must never decline' (Beckerman 1999, p. 72) .
The exact requirements of intergenerational sufficientarianism will depend on the specification of the threshold of sufficiency, which will be framed in terms of the best scientific evidence available and modified by public deliberation about what constitutes 'having enough' and 'dangerous climate change.' We can assume, however, that a sufficientarian approach would involve stringent action to stabilize, and later reduce, concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (to minimize the number of lives that are forced below the sufficiency threshold by climate changes that are still preventable) and major international investments in terms of technologies of adaptation (to maximize the number of lives lived at or above the threshold in the face of climate impacts that are no longer avoidable).
Aside from working towards a tougher global climate accord to replace the current Kyoto Protocol when it expires in 2012, there are numerous measures of mitigation and adaptation available to the present generation to work towards intergenerational sufficiency. A range of measures could be adopted that would reduce greenhouse emissions, such as energy efficiency measures in both the industrial and domestic sectors; changes in transport patterns; and more efficient land management practices (Markandya & Halsnaes 2001, pp. 474ff.; Stern 2007, pp. 349ff.) . Meanwhile, water security could be enhanced in developed and developing countries by improving flood defences; human health impacts could be minimized by improved public health infrastructure in communities vulnerable to extreme weather events; and the socio-economic infrastructure of vulnerable populations could be protected by improved planning (Stern 2007, pp. 486ff.) . In each case, the idea is that earlier generations are bound by a sufficientarian duty to ensure that their successors have access to a climate system that is hospitable for decent human lives.
Perhaps the central difficulty with the doctrine of intergenerational sufficiency is that it is so sensitive to initial distributions of well-being. Consider the following three background scenarios where very many persons currently lie below the point where they have enough (set as 100 units of well-being). In a 'radical insufficiency' situation, we can help all above the threshold, although this would also involve creating large inequalities. In a 'triage insufficiency' situation, we can help some, but not all, to reach the sufficiency threshold although this would also create inequality and would damage the prospects of the very worst off. In a 'hopeless insufficiency' situation, we can improve the situation of many people, but not so that any lead decent lives.
The appeal of the sufficiency view in 'triage insufficiency' cases is that its rivals are inclined to condemn interventions that result in much of the population leading a decent life for the sake of ethical goals that seem inconsequential in the circumstances, namely, the minimization of inequality or the maximization of the position of the worst off. The attraction of the view in 'radical insufficiency' cases is that, unlike egalitarianism, it can explain why redistribution would be just. The sufficiency view, however, cannot apparently explain why we should intervene in 'hopeless insufficiency' cases despite the outcome being greater well-being for all.
The sufficientarian has at least two responses to this problem, one defensive and one offensive. Defensively, it could be claimed that it is too much to ask of one theory that it provide an intuitive approach in all possible instances of distribution. People's intuitions about the appropriate pattern of well-being in particular cases, even when purged of obvious biases and prejudices, seem so diversely motivated that no theory of justice will cohere with all of them.
Offensively, it could be claimed that sufficientarianism is a genuinely distinctive approach to distributive justice in 'radical insufficiency' and 'triage insufficiency' situations, and 'hopeless insufficiency' situations are rare enough to be put to one side. As we saw above, a number of studies indicate that the lives of millions of existing and future people could be greatly improved through measures of mitigation and adaptation so that the numbers of existing persons who will ever live above sufficiency is maximized. While estimating the future global distribution of well-being is a difficult enterprise, the vast majority of studies assume that the current situation is one of radical, not hopeless, insufficiency (World Bank 2001, pp. 6ff.; 2005, pp. 9ff.; Pogge 2005, pp. 92ff .; United Nations 2005, pp. 23ff.). Meanwhile, a different approach to 'hopeless sufficiency' might be to enable people to get as close as possible to the sufficiency threshold so that they have the best possible chance of attaining a decent life at some point in the future (Copp 2005, pp. 42-43) .
There are two further issues that sufficientarians have not adequately addressed. First, what should be done in situations where all have enough? Can it really be the case that there can be no distributive injustice in such situations? Consider this example (where the sufficiency level has been set at 100):
(1) Half at 150, half at 200 (2) All at 200
It seems that the doctrine of sufficiency will not distinguish between these scenarios, even though (2) would be preferable to (1) in terms of all rival values. That is, (2) would be much more equal, much better for the worst off, and would create more utility. Can a cogent theory of justice view such gains as insignificant from the perspective of justice?
Second, a further problem arises relating to the strength of the priority that sufficientarians give to acts and policies that bring at least some additional persons to the point at which they have enough. Consider the following case (where the sufficiency level has again been set at 100):
(3) 99% of persons at 10, 1% of persons at 100 (4) All persons at 99
Here, the most obvious version of the sufficiency doctrine, which holds that bringing people up to the sufficiency level has lexical priority over other values, would require that we opt for distribution (3) over (4) even though this means forgoing great increases in well-being for the vast majority. The problem is that this seems to assign an implausibly great marginal value to the gain in well-being that takes a person from just below to just above the point where they are content (Arneson 1995, pp. 498 -500; 2006, p. 28) .
One way of responding to the problems raised by these two examples would be to construct a 'pluralist' approach to distributive justice. Pluralism, in this context, means that we would appeal to contrasting ideals in different contexts (Daniels 1996, p. 208) . There are three possibilities, which I can only sketch here. First, the ideals could apply in different distributive circumstances. For example, we might give lexical priority to sufficiency when at least some can be brought up to the threshold, but appeal to equality or priority when all are above, or all below, the threshold (Crisp 2003, pp. 758ff.) .
Second, sufficiency might be allocated non-lexical priority over other values so that large gains in these values will sometimes outweigh lesser gains in sufficiency. Arneson has usefully labeled this 'moderate sufficientarianism' (Arneson 2006, p. 28) . The strength of this view is that it can explain why we should opt for (2) over (1) since it offers tremendous gains in both equality and priority with no adverse impact on sufficiency. Similarly, though more controversially, moderate sufficientarians have at least some reason to opt for (4) over (3) since great benefits arise, in terms of equality and priority, if we ignore the sufficiency of the few for the prize of giving major benefits to the many.
Third, we might subsume one ideal under another while attributing some degree of intrinsic value to the subsumed ideal. Sufficientarians generally view inequality as regrettable because of its consequences, such as the way in which it inhibits economic growth, undermines political processes, or is a malign influence on cultural life. Yet, there is a more subtle way that inequality matters. This is that some people might fail to reach the standards of a decent life if they are continually faced with the discomfiture that many others are far better off. Similarly, some people might fall below the threshold of sufficiency if they begin to enjoy life less as a result of identifying with the resentment of others who are worse off (Marmor 2003, pp. 127ff) .
I have no space to develop these intriguing possibilities here. I would merely note that the attractiveness of pluralism as an approach to distributive justice is that different ideals match our intuitions in different contexts. Constructing a defensible theory, however, requires much more than tinkering with different principles and their weighting in order to fit with our intuitions in different cases. It must also involve a careful consideration of the principles and the connections between them that is to some extent independent of our intuitions in particular cases. To skip over this second step would invite the criticism that the new theory is parochial in that it 'merely systematizes and renders coherent the particular beliefs of the cultural or ideological group among whose members the practitioner of the method happens to be' (Buchanan et al. 2002, p. 372) .
Defending the Sufficiency Threshold
Ascribing sufficiency either moderate or lexical priority over other values presupposes a controversial ethical notion. This is that there is a particular point where a life ceases to have enough of some currency of well-being. Yet, what is enough? According to some, there is no coherent answer to this question. Arneson, for example, writes that:
A human life can be better or worse for the one who lives it. Well-being varies by degree. But it is not so clear that there is a natural way to identify a good enough level, a threshold such that it is of paramount moral importance to get people to the threshold but a matter of relative indifference what happens to them above the threshold. (Arneson 2006, p. 27) In this last section, I respond to such criticisms by arguing, first, that the sufficiency threshold is conceptually meaningful; and, second, that we can render the threshold more concrete by appealing to the notion of basic needs.
One problem with the threshold is that it assumes that there can be circumstances where a person lies just below, or just above, the point where they lead a decent life. In such cases, it becomes unclear how the sufficiency doctrine applies since we will not be able to identify a precise point where additional allocations of well-being will make the statement 'this person has enough' switch from being false to being true. In this sense, the doctrine of sufficiency seems entangled in philosophical vagueness (Arneson 1995, p. 498; Orr 2005) . There are several considerations, however, that point in the direction of accepting at least some morally relevant thresholds of well-being. Some of these reflect the actual behaviour and attitudes of individuals and institutions. Persons, states, and international institutions habitually make assumptions about the necessary features of a decent life. In order to determine whether the sufficiency threshold is philosophically meaningful, we should ask whether agents assume that it exists in their everyday interactions and practical reasoning (O'Neill 2000, pp. 192ff.; Orr 2005) . To put it slightly differently, we focus not on the difficulty of specifying a precise definition of sufficiency in the face of philosophical vagueness, but rather we ask what practical work a sufficiency threshold can do, for example in the construction of policies to reduce poverty.
To some, the above might seem a rather arbitrary approach to the grounding of the sufficiency threshold. Yet, it is worth remembering that philosophical vagueness means that the attribution of intrinsic moral importance to any particular specification of well-being is problematic. Take, for example, the widely used indicator for 'extreme poverty' of an income of less than $1.08 per day, measured in terms of 1993 US$.
In 2005, the UN estimated that roughly 1.1 billion people lived under this threshold, 46% of which lived in Sub-Saharan Africa and 31% in South Asia (United Nations 2005, p. 9). The precise specification of the threshold of extreme poverty is as arbitrary as any threshold of sufficiency, despite being set at a much lower level. Yet, such indicators have proven to be extremely useful in the formulation of the goals and targets of development policy. The first of the UN's Millennium Goals, for example, has the target of reducing by half the proportion of people in the world who experience 'extreme poverty' as defined above by 2015 (United Nations 2005, p. xii). In the sense that they are widely understood, and provide practical assistance for the application of moral principles, such thresholds are far from arbitrary.
Suppose we accepted that, following the practical method suggested above, it was at least conceptually plausible to posit a boundary between a life that has sufficient wellbeing and a life that has not. A substantive problem remains in identifying where, and how, this boundary might be set. As has been mentioned, Frankfurt views 'having enough' as much more than having access to the wherewithal necessary to make life tolerable. It should not, then, be thought of as the minimum level at which a person ceases to experience 'extreme poverty' or exceeds a slightly more generous indicator of well-being such as the UN's threshold of 'mere poverty' of $2.15 or more a day. Instead, the doctrine of sufficiency relies on a threshold of well-being where a person exhibits no substantial discomfort or distress throughout a life of normal lifespan. So long as all persons who are physically and mentally able have the wherewithal to lead such a life, the duties and entitlements of distributive justice are exhausted.
Although I cannot offer too much precision here, as the threshold will surely vary as it is applied across both space and time, I suggest that a useful way of concretizing the notion of a sufficiency threshold would be to appeal to the notion of 'basic needs' in a much more explicit way than has yet been proposed. Here, we say that a person has enough when all of their basic human needs have been met and are likely to continue to be met. The core idea is that basic needs must be fulfilled in order for their bearers to avoid significant harm. As Copp argues, 'matters of basic need are things anyone would require in some quantity and in some form in order to avoid a blighted or harmed life' (Copp 1998, p. 124; Doyal & Gough 1991, pp. 39ff.) . While there are several ways in which we might unpack the notion of harm, the most attractive connects the absence of harm with the capacity to be an autonomous rational agent capable of performing the tasks expected of fully functioning members of society. On this view, basic needs are:
. . . the things that, at some time in the course of life, are indispensable in some form and quantity to a rational and autonomous life for a human, given the 'laws of nature, unalterable and invariable environmental facts, or facts about human constitution'. (Copp 1998, p. 125) The notion of basic need requires much further elaboration. For example, it is useful to distinguish between 'basic needs' (such as physical and mental health) and the 'satisfiers' of these needs (such as income and healthcare). The satisfiers of needs will vary according to a person's physical and mental constitution, as well as their historical and cultural circumstances. The basic needs themselves, however, are universal and objective. They are universal, in the sense that persons living at all times and all places have reason to value the life of a fully functioning member of their society. They are objective in the sense that they are required regardless of whether, and to what extent, they are desired. Put simply, the approach I am proposing seeks to enable as many existing and future persons as possible to fulfil their basic needs throughout a normal lifespan.
This sketch of what might be called 'global needs sufficientarianism' leaves many questions unanswered. First, there is a lingering doubt that the level of well-being associated with meeting one's basic needs is much lower than the level of well-being associated with 'having enough' or of 'leading a decent life.' A great deal more work remains to be done to unpack these two ideas, as well as what constitutes a 'normal life' and 'a normal lifespan.' Second, there remains the question of how to settle clashes of need both within and between generations. Even in relatively favourable situations it may not be possible to guarantee the sufficiency of one population without sacrificing the sufficiency of another. When these populations belong to different generations, a peculiarly intractable problem arises of whose sufficiency should take precedence since future persons can neither express nor press their needs.
Third, and finally, problems remain concerning the scope of justice. The literature on basic needs tends to assume that the bearers of basic needs are individuals, whereas the states to which they belong are the bearers of the duties to meet these needs (Copp 2005 ). Yet, the peculiar features of intergenerational relations compound the problem of identifying the appropriate level of analysis at which the claims and duties of justice should operate (Caney 2005, pp. 754ff.) . Until cogent answers to the above questions emerge, sufficientarianism remains a promising, yet incomplete, approach to intergenerational justice.
Notes
[1] It is worth noting that, for some, any society that aims to bring about a certain pattern of benefits in order to realise a distributive ideal is itself unjust. For such writers, only 'historical' principles, which explain how resources should be distributed in terms of how they came to be owned and later transferred, are consistent with distributive justice. (See Nozick 1974, pp. 153ff.) [2] I am grateful to Simon Caney for discussion of this example, as well as for detailed and illuminating comments on an earlier version of this article.
